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Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 15:21:28 +0100
From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Thomas Gleixner
<tglx@...utronix.de>, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
alan@...ux.intel.com, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@...fitbricks.com>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@...e.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.4 178/193] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table
de-references under speculation
On 02/23/2018, 07:26 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
>
> (cherry picked from commit 2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681)
>
> The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
> space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation.
>
> While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it
> does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory
> relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache
> behavior.
>
> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
> Cc: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> Cc: alan@...ux.intel.com
> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
> [jwang: port to 4.4, no syscall_64]
This is not complete IMO, the syscall is indeed there, only written in
assembly in 4.4 yet.
So this patch looks like it is missing these two hunks (from my
SLE12-SP2 backport):
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
> cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax
> #endif
> ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */
> + sbb %rcx, %rcx /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
> + and %rcx, %rax
> movq %r10, %rcx
> #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax
> @@ -282,6 +284,8 @@ tracesys_phase2:
> cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax
> #endif
> ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */
> + sbb %rcx, %rcx /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
> + and %rcx, %rax
> movq %r10, %rcx /* fixup for C */
> #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax
Discovered by Jan Beulich.
thanks,
--
js
suse labs
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