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Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 18:08:34 -0800
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v5 next 5/5] net: modules: use
request_module_cap() to load 'netdev-%s' modules
On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 4:44 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
>> That mainly leaves the protocol ones we need to look out for, I suspect.
>
> This is where a lot of the exposure really comes from. socket()
> triggers a bunch of stuff, but doesn't have an obvious privilege
> associated with it... while it already does the name templates, maybe
> add request_module_socket() just to explicitly mark it?
.. and this is where I'd expect that maybe we'd need some hackery.
Even including some ad-hoc rules like "this module is actually
maintained", possibly even with some /sys interface to extend/reduce
that set.
But maybe it's not even that bad.
Linus
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