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Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2017 06:37:28 +0300
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>, Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl
On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 10:06:46AM +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 12, 2017 at 02:10:07AM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 07, 2017 at 09:32:11PM +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > Currently we are leaking addresses from the kernel to user space. This
> > > script is an attempt to find some of those leakages. Script parses
> > > `dmesg` output and /proc and /sys files for hex strings that look like
> > > kernel addresses.
> > >
> > > Only works for 64 bit kernels, the reason being that kernel addresses
> > > on 64 bit kernels have 'ffff' as the leading bit pattern making greping
> > > possible. On 32 kernels we don't have this luxury.
> >
> > Well, it's not going to work as well as intented on x86 machine with
> > 5-level paging. Kernel address space there starts at 0xff10000000000000.
> > It will still catch pointers to kernel/modules text, but the rest is
> > outside of 0xffff... space. See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt.
>
> Thanks for the link. So it looks like we need to refactor the kernel
> address regular expression into a function that takes into account the
> machine architecture and the number of page table levels. We will need
> to add this to the false positive checks also.
>
> > Not sure if we care. It won't work too for other 64-bit architectrues that
> > have more than 256TB of virtual address space.
>
> Is this because of the virtual memory map?
On x86 direct mapping is the nearest thing we have to userspace.
> Did you mean 512TB?
No, I mean 256TB.
You have all kernel memory in the range from 0xffff000000000000 to
0xffffffffffffffff if you have 256 TB of virtual address space. If you
hvae more, some thing might be ouside the range.
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
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