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Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 21:21:34 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...onical.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Mahesh Bandewar <mahesh@...dewar.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel-hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control
capabilities of some user namespaces
On Thu, Nov 09, 2017 at 09:55:41AM +0900, Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 9, 2017 at 4:02 AM, Christian Brauner
> <christian.brauner@...onical.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 08, 2017 at 03:09:59AM -0800, Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) wrote:
> >> Sorry folks I was traveling and seems like lot happened on this thread. :p
> >>
> >> I will try to response few of these comments selectively -
> >>
> >> > The thing that makes me hesitate with this set is that it is a
> >> > permanent new feature to address what (I hope) is a temporary
> >> > problem.
> >> I agree this is permanent new feature but it's not solving a temporary
> >> problem. It's impossible to assess what and when new vulnerability
> >> that could show up. I think Daniel summed it up appropriately in his
> >> response
> >>
> >> > Seems like there are two naive ways to do it, the first being to just
> >> > look at all code under ns_capable() plus code called from there. It
> >> > seems like looking at the result of that could be fruitful.
> >> This is really hard. The main issue that there were features designed
> >> and developed before user-ns days with an assumption that unprivileged
> >> users will never get certain capabilities which only root user gets.
> >> Now that is not true anymore with user-ns creation with mapping root
> >> for any process. Also at the same time blocking user-ns creation for
> >> eveyone is a big-hammer which is not needed too. So it's not that easy
> >> to just perform a code-walk-though and correct those decisions now.
> >>
> >> > It seems to me that the existing control in
> >> > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone might be the better duct tape
> >> > in that case.
> >> This solution is essentially blocking unprivileged users from using
> >> the user-namespaces entirely. This is not really a solution that can
> >> work. The solution that this patch-set adds allows unprivileged users
> >> to create user-namespaces. Actually the proposed solution is more
> >> fine-grained approach than the unprivileged_userns_clone solution
> >> since you can selectively block capabilities rather than completely
> >> blocking the functionality.
> >
> > I've been talking to Stéphane today about this and we should also keep in mind
> > that we have:
> >
> > chb@...ventiont|~
> >> ls -al /proc/sys/user/
> > total 0
> > dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Nov 6 23:32 .
> > dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Nov 2 22:13 ..
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_cgroup_namespaces
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_inotify_instances
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_inotify_watches
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_ipc_namespaces
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_mnt_namespaces
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_net_namespaces
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_pid_namespaces
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_user_namespaces
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 8 19:48 max_uts_namespaces
> >
> > These files allow you to limit the number of namespaces that can be created
> > *per namespace* type. So let's say your system runs a bunch of user namespaces
> > you can do:
> >
> > chb@...ventiont|~
> >> echo 0 > /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces
> >
> > So that the next time you try to create a user namespaces you'd see:
> >
> > chb@...ventiont|~
> >> unshare -U
> > unshare: unshare failed: No space left on device
> >
> > So there's not even a need to upstream a new sysctl since we have ways of
> > blocking this.
> >
> I'm not sure how it's solving the problem that my patch-set is addressing?
> I agree though that the need for unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl goes
> away as this is equivalent to setting that sysctl to 0 as you have
> described above.
oh right that was the reasoning iirc for not needing the other sysctl.
> However as I mentioned earlier, blocking processes from creating
> user-namespaces is not the solution. Processes should be able to
> create namespaces as they are designed but at the same time we need to
> have controls to 'contain' them if a need arise. Setting max_no to 0
> is not the solution that I'm looking for since it doesn't solve the
> problem.
well yesterday we were told that was explicitly not the goal, but that was
not by you ... i just mention it to explain why we seem to be walking in
circles a bit.
anyway the bounding set doesn't actually make sense so forget that. the
question then is just whether it makes sense to allow things to continue
at all in this situation. would you mind indulging me by giving one or two
concrete examples in the previous known cves of what capabilities you would
have dropped tto allow the rest to continue to be safely used?
thanks,
serge
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