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Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 13:22:13 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
Cc: Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>, "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>, Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl
On Mon, Nov 6, 2017 at 9:27 AM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 5, 2017 at 9:19 PM, Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc> wrote:
>> Currently we are leaking addresses from the kernel to user space. This
>> script is an attempt to find some of those leakages. Script parses
>> `dmesg` output and /proc and /sys files for hex strings that look like
>> kernel addresses.
>
> Lovely. This is great. It shows just how much totally pointless stuff
> we leak, and to normal users that really shouldn't need it.
>
> I had planned to wait for 4.15 to look at the printk hashing stuff
> etc, but this part I think I could/should merge early just because I
> think a lot of kernel developers will go "Why the f*ck would we expose
> that kernel address there?"
>
> The module sections stuff etc should likely be obviously root-only,
> although maybe I'm missing some tool that ends up using it and is
> useful to normal developers.
>
> And I'm thinking we could make kallsyms smarter too, and instead of
> depending on kptr_restrict that screws over things with much too big a
> hammer, we could make it take 'perf_event_paranoid' into account. I
> suspect that's the main user of kallsyms that would still be relevant
> to non-root.
Linus, what do you have in mind for the root-only "yes we really need
the actual address output" exceptions?
For example, right now /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
(CONFIG_X86_PTDUMP=y) needs actual address and currently uses %x.
Looking other places that stand out, it seems like
/proc/lockdep_chains and /proc/lockdep (CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y) has a ton of
%p usage. It's unclear to me if a hash is sufficient for meaningful
debugging there?
Seems like these three from dmesg could be removed?
[ 0.000000] Base memory trampoline at [ffffa3fc40099000] 99000 size 24576
arch/x86/realmode/init.c
[ 0.000000] percpu: Embedded 38 pages/cpu @ffffa4007fc00000 s116944
r8192 d30512 u524288
mm/percpu.c
[ 0.456395] software IO TLB [mem 0xbbfdf000-0xbffdf000] (64MB)
mapped at [ffffa3fcfbfdf000-ffffa3fcfffdefff]
lib/swiotlb.c
Tobin, some other feedback on v4...
I find the output hard to parse. Instead of:
[27527 lockdep_chains] [ffffffffb226c628] cgroup_mutex
Could we have:
27527 /proc/lockdep_chains: [ffffffffb226c628] cgroup_mutex
At the very least, getting the full file path is needed or might not
be clear where something lives.
And for my kernels, I needed to exclude usbmon or the script would
hang (perhaps add a read timeout to the script to detect stalling
files?)
diff --git a/scripts/leaking_addresses.pl b/scripts/leaking_addresses.pl
index 282c0cc2bdea..a9b729c0a052 100644
--- a/scripts/leaking_addresses.pl
+++ b/scripts/leaking_addresses.pl
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ my @skip_walk_dirs_any = ('self',
'thread-self',
'cwd',
'fd',
+ 'usbmon',
'stderr',
'stdin',
'stdout');
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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