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Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2017 20:15:42 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>, "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, 
	Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, 
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>, 
	Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>, 
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, 
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, 
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>, 
	Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options

On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 8:10 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> But plain %p has definitely been a problem, and I don't think %pa is
> great either. So aiming to get rid of them entirely is probably a good
> idea.

As you've hinted, doing this will make %x use go up, of course, so I
remain convinced that we need some kind of at-runtime evaluation of
the arguments coming into v*sprintf(). If we removed the raw %p format
string, we'd want to stop %x from being used on memory addresses too.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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