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Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 13:38:19 -0700
From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Miroslav Benes <mbenes@...e.cz>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Pratyush Anand <panand@...hat.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@...lanox.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote:
> >> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
> >> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate
> >> privileges [1].
> >>
> >> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
> >> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
> >> needed.
> >>
> >> The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture
> >> function to check the address limit.
> >>
> >> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
> >
> > Thanks for reworking this series!
> >
> > The bad state correctly BUGs under the LKDTM test:
> >
> > [ 21.171586] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_USER_DS
> > [ 21.172791] lkdtm: setting bad task size limit
> > [ 21.173742] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > [ 21.174641] kernel BUG at ./include/linux/syscalls.h:220!
> > ...
> > [ 21.193166] Call Trace:
> > [ 21.193617] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
> > [ 21.194443] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> >
> >
> > Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>
> Is everyone happy with this patch for x86? Does this need anything
> more/different?
Asking again. Additional feedback? Anyone wants to pick-it up?
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security
--
Thomas
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