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Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 21:28:39 +0200
From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@...akpoint.cc>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, tglx@...akpoint.cc
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng
init
On 2017-06-08 01:25:55 [+0200], Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> It's possible that get_random_{u32,u64} is used before the crng has
> initialized, in which case, its output might not be cryptographically
> secure. For this problem, directly, this patch set is introducing the
> *_wait variety of functions, but even with that, there's a subtle issue:
> what happens to our batched entropy that was generated before
> initialization. Prior to this commit, it'd stick around, supplying bad
> numbers. After this commit, we force the entropy to be re-extracted
> after each phase of the crng has initialized.
>
> In order to avoid a race condition with the position counter, we
> introduce a simple rwlock for this invalidation. Since it's only during
> this awkward transition period, after things are all set up, we stop
> using it, so that it doesn't have an impact on performance.
>
> This should probably be backported to 4.11.
>
> (Also: adding my copyright to the top. With the patch series from
> January, this patch, and then the ones that come after, I think there's
> a relevant amount of code in here to add my name to the top.)
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
I don't understand why lockdep notices this possible deadlock only in
RT:
| the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
|
| -> #1 (primary_crng.lock){+.+...}:
| lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0
| rt_spin_lock+0x46/0x50
| _extract_crng+0x39/0xa0
| extract_crng+0x3a/0x40
| get_random_u64+0x17a/0x200
| cache_random_seq_create+0x51/0x100
| init_cache_random_seq+0x35/0x90
| __kmem_cache_create+0xd3/0x560
| create_boot_cache+0x8c/0xb2
| create_kmalloc_cache+0x54/0x9f
| create_kmalloc_caches+0xe3/0xfd
| kmem_cache_init+0x14f/0x1f0
| start_kernel+0x1e7/0x3b3
| x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
| x86_64_start_kernel+0x13d/0x14c
| verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc
|
| -> #0 (batched_entropy_reset_lock){+.+...}:
| __lock_acquire+0x11b4/0x1320
| lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0
| rt_write_lock+0x26/0x40
| rt_write_lock_irqsave+0x9/0x10
| invalidate_batched_entropy+0x28/0xb0
| crng_fast_load+0xb5/0xe0
| add_interrupt_randomness+0x16c/0x1a0
| irq_thread+0x15c/0x1e0
| kthread+0x112/0x150
| ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40
We have the path add_interrupt_randomness() -> crng_fast_load() which
take
primary_crng.lock -> batched_entropy_reset_lock
and we have get_random_uXX() -> extract_crng() which take the locks in
opposite order:
batched_entropy_reset_lock -> crng->lock
however batched_entropy_reset_lock() is only taken if "crng_init < 2" so
it is possible RT hits this constraint more reliably.
> ---
> drivers/char/random.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index a561f0c2f428..d35da1603e12 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
> /*
> * random.c -- A strong random number generator
> *
> + * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All
> + * Rights Reserved.
> + *
> * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
> *
> * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
> @@ -762,6 +765,8 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
> static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
> #endif
>
> +static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
> +
> static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
> {
> int i;
> @@ -799,6 +804,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
> cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--;
> }
> if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
> + invalidate_batched_entropy();
> crng_init = 1;
> wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
> pr_notice("random: fast init done\n");
> @@ -836,6 +842,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
> memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
> crng->init_time = jiffies;
> if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
> + invalidate_batched_entropy();
> crng_init = 2;
> process_random_ready_list();
> wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
> @@ -2023,6 +2030,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
> };
> unsigned int position;
> };
> +static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_reset_lock);
>
> /*
> * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
> @@ -2033,6 +2041,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);
> u64 get_random_u64(void)
> {
> u64 ret;
> + const bool use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
> + unsigned long flags = 0;
> struct batched_entropy *batch;
>
> #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
> @@ -2045,11 +2055,15 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
> #endif
>
> batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);
> + if (use_lock)
> + read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
> if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
> extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
> batch->position = 0;
> }
> ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
> + if (use_lock)
> + read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
> put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);
> return ret;
> }
> @@ -2059,22 +2073,45 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32);
> u32 get_random_u32(void)
> {
> u32 ret;
> + const bool use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2;
> + unsigned long flags = 0;
> struct batched_entropy *batch;
>
> if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
> return ret;
>
> batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);
> + if (use_lock)
> + read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
> if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
> extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
> batch->position = 0;
> }
> ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
> + if (use_lock)
> + read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
> put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
>
> +/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
> + * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
> + * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
> + * next usage. */
> +static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
> +{
> + int cpu;
> + unsigned long flags;
> +
> + write_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
> + for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
> + per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = 0;
> + per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = 0;
> + }
> + write_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
> * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
> --
> 2.13.0
Sebastian
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