[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 20:32:02 +1000 (AEST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array
of struct list_head
On Mon, 29 May 2017, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Igor proposed a sealable memory allocator, and the LSM hooks
> ("struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads" and
> "struct security_hook_list ...[]") will benefit from that allocator via
> protection using set_memory_ro()/set_memory_rw(), and that allocator
> will remove CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS config option. Thus, we will
> likely be moving to that direction.
>
> This means that these structures will be allocated at run time using
> that allocator, and therefore the address of these structures will be
> determined at run time rather than compile time.
>
> But currently, LSM_HOOK_INIT() macro depends on the address of
> security_hook_heads being known at compile time. If we use an enum
> so that LSM_HOOK_INIT() macro does not need to know absolute address of
> security_hook_heads, it will help us to use that allocator for LSM hooks.
>
This seems like pointless churn in security-critical code in anticipation
of features which are still in development and may not be adopted.
Is there a compelling reason to merge this now? (And I don't mean worrying
about non-existent compliers).
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
