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Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2017 16:19:05 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, Dongsu Park <dpark@...teo.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>, Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>, Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
belakhdar abdeldjalil <zendyani@...il.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules
autoload restriction
On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 7:41 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 4:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 4:15 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 3:20 PM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com> wrote:
>>>> +/* Sets task's modules_autoload */
>>>> +static inline int task_set_modules_autoload(struct task_struct *task,
>>>> + unsigned long value)
>>>> +{
>>>> + if (value > MODULES_AUTOLOAD_DISABLED)
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> + else if (task->modules_autoload > value)
>>>> + return -EPERM;
>>>> + else if (task->modules_autoload < value)
>>>> + task->modules_autoload = value;
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> This needs to be more locked down. Otherwise someone could set this
>>> and then run a setuid program. Admittedly, it would be quite odd if
>>> this particular thing causes a problem, but the issue exists
>>> nonetheless.
>>
>> Eeeh, I don't agree this needs to be changed. APIs provided by modules
>> are different than the existing privilege-manipulation syscalls this
>> concern stems from. Applications are already forced to deal with
>> things being missing like this in the face of it simply not being
>> built into the kernel.
>>
>> Having to hide this behind nnp seems like it'd reduce its utility...
>>
>
> I think that adding an inherited boolean to task_struct that can be
> set by unprivileged tasks and passed to privileged tasks is a terrible
> precedent. Ideally someone would try to find all the existing things
> like this and kill them off.
(Tristate, not boolean, but yeah.)
I see two others besides seccomp and nnp:
PR_MCE_KILL
PR_SET_THP_DISABLE
I really don't think this needs nnp protection.
> I agree that I don't see how one would exploit this particular
> feature, but I still think I dislike the approach. This is a slippery
> slope to adding a boolean for perf_event_open(), unshare(), etc, and
> we should solve these for real rather than half-arsing them IMO.
I disagree (obviously); this would be protecting the entire module
autoload attack surface. That's hardly a specific control, and it's a
demonstrably needed flag.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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