[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 20:02:57 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Hoeun Ryu <hoeun.ryu@...il.com>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] arm64: support HAVE_ARCH_RARE_WRITE
On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 7:00 AM, Hoeun Ryu <hoeun.ryu@...il.com> wrote:
> This RFC is a quick and dirty arm64 implementation for Kees Cook's RFC for
> rare_write infrastructure [1].
Awesome! :)
> This implementation is based on Mark Rutland's suggestions, which is that
> a special userspace mm that maps only __start/end_rodata as RW permission
> is prepared during early boot time (paging_init) and __arch_rare_write_map()
> switches to the mm [2].
>
> Due to the limit of implementation (the mm having RW mapping is userspace
> mm), we need a new arch-specific __arch_rare_write_ptr() to convert RO
> address to RW address (CONFIG_HAVE_RARE_WRITE_PTR is added), which is
> general for all architectures (__rare_write_ptr()) in Kees's RFC . So all
> writes should be instrumented by __rare_write().
Cool, yeah, I'll get all this fixed up in my next version.
> One caveat for arm64 is CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN.
> Because __arch_rare_write_map() installes a special user mm to ttbr0,
> usercopy inside __arch_rare_write_map/unmap() pair will break rare_write.
> (uaccess_enable() replaces the special mm and RW alias is no longer valid.)
That's totally fine constraint: this case should never happen for so
many reasons. :)
> A similar problem could rise in general usercopy inside
> __arch_rare_write_map/unmap(). __arch_rare_write_map() replaces current->mm,
> so we loose the address space of the `current` process.
>
> It passes LKDTM's rare write test.
>
> [1] : http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/02/27/5
> [2] : https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/2/22/254
>
> Signed-off-by: Hoeun Ryu <hoeun.ryu@...il.com>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
