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Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 14:01:13 -0800
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] security: mark nf ops in
SELinux and Smack as __ro_after_init
On 2/13/2017 1:49 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 1:32 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 2/13/2017 1:03 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2017-02-13 at 09:29 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 3:29 AM, Tetsuo Handa
>>>> <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
>>>>> James Morris wrote:
>>>>>> Both SELinux and Smack register Netfilter operations during init,
>>>>>> which then don't change. Mark these ops as __ro_after_init.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
>>>>> This patch breaks CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE=y +
>>>>> SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config case,
>>>>> doesn't it? Although I heard that SELinux is planning to remove
>>>>> CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE,
>>>>> CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE is valid as of current linux-
>>>>> security.git#next .
>>>> We could fold that removal into this series?
>>> I'm personally in favor of removing it, but that support was originally
>>> requested by the Fedora distro folks on the grounds that it is too
>>> painful to manage kernel boot parameters on some platforms, and
>>> therefore they needed an alternative to booting with selinux=0 on the
>>> kernel command line. The documented way to disable SELinux on such
>>> distros is through the use of /etc/selinux/config SELINUX=disabled,
>>> which relies on this mechanism. So you'd have to work through removal
>>> with the distro folks.
>>>
>>> Maybe in the interim we could just wrap the ro-after-init markings
>>> under a conditional dependent on !CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE so
>>> that systems (e.g. Android) that do not rely on this feature could
>>> benefit.
>> If we changed CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE to
>> CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_MODULES and put the __ro_after_init
>> under !CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_MODULES we solve both the
>> current and potential future issues.
> Something like...
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_LSM
> # define lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
> # define lsm_const const
> #else
> # define lsm_ro_after_init
> # define lsm_const
> #endif
>
> ?
That's more elaborate than I was thinking, but sure.
I was going to put ifdefs in the respective declarations,
but this may be more in line with modern tastes.
>
> -Kees
>
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