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Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 22:20:51 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP)" <cgroups@...r.kernel.org>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 09/10] landlock: Handle cgroups (performance)
On 30/08/2016 20:55, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 28, 2016 at 2:42 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28/08/2016 10:13, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Aug 27, 2016 11:14 PM, "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 27/08/2016 22:43, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>>> On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 09:35:14PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>>>> On 27/08/2016 20:06, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>>>>> On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 04:06:38PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>>>>>> As said above, Landlock will not run an eBPF programs when not strictly
>>>>>>>> needed. Attaching to a cgroup will have the same performance impact as
>>>>>>>> attaching to a process hierarchy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Having a prog per cgroup per lsm_hook is the only scalable way I
>>>>>>> could come up with. If you see another way, please propose.
>>>>>>> current->seccomp.landlock_prog is not the answer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hum, I don't see the difference from a performance point of view between
>>>>>> a cgroup-based or a process hierarchy-based system.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe a better option should be to use an array of pointers with N
>>>>>> entries, one for each supported hook, instead of a unique pointer list?
>>>>>
>>>>> yes, clearly array dereference is faster than link list walk.
>>>>> Now the question is where to keep this prog_array[num_lsm_hooks] ?
>>>>> Since we cannot keep it inside task_struct, we have to allocate it.
>>>>> Every time the task is creted then. What to do on the fork? That
>>>>> will require changes all over. Then the obvious optimization would be
>>>>> to share this allocated array of prog pointers across multiple tasks...
>>>>> and little by little this new facility will look like cgroup.
>>>>> Hence the suggestion to put this array into cgroup from the start.
>>>>
>>>> I see your point :)
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Anyway, being able to attach an LSM hook program to a cgroup thanks to
>>>>>> the new BPF_PROG_ATTACH seems a good idea (while keeping the possibility
>>>>>> to use a process hierarchy). The downside will be to handle an LSM hook
>>>>>> program which is not triggered by a seccomp-filter, but this should be
>>>>>> needed anyway to handle interruptions.
>>>>>
>>>>> what do you mean 'not triggered by seccomp' ?
>>>>> You're not suggesting that this lsm has to enable seccomp to be functional?
>>>>> imo that's non starter due to overhead.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, for now, it is triggered by a new seccomp filter return value
>>>> RET_LANDLOCK, which can take a 16-bit value called cookie. This must not
>>>> be needed but could be useful to bind a seccomp filter security policy
>>>> with a Landlock one. Waiting for Kees's point of view…
>>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not Kees, but I'd be okay with that. I still think that doing
>>> this by process hierarchy a la seccomp will be easier to use and to
>>> understand (which is quite important for this kind of work) than doing
>>> it by cgroup.
>>>
>>> A feature I've wanted to add for a while is to have an fd that
>>> represents a seccomp layer, the idea being that you would set up your
>>> seccomp layer (with syscall filter, landlock hooks, etc) and then you
>>> would have a syscall to install that layer. Then an unprivileged
>>> sandbox manager could set up its layer and still be able to inject new
>>> processes into it later on, no cgroups needed.
>>
>> A nice thing I didn't highlight about Landlock is that a process can
>> prepare a layer of rules (arraymap of handles + Landlock programs) and
>> pass the file descriptors of the Landlock programs to another process.
>> This process could then apply this programs to get sandboxed. However,
>> for now, because a Landlock program is only triggered by a seccomp
>> filter (which do not follow the Landlock programs as a FD), they will be
>> useless.
>>
>> The FD referring to an arraymap of handles can also be used to update a
>> map and change the behavior of a Landlock program. A master process can
>> then add or remove restrictions to another process hierarchy on the fly.
>
> Maybe this could be extended a little bit. The fd could hold the
> seccomp filter *and* the LSM hook filters. FMODE_EXECUTE could give
> the ability to install it and FMODE_WRITE could give the ability to
> modify it.
>
This is interesting! It should be possible to append the seccomp stack
of a source process to the seccomp stack of the target process when a
Landlock program is passed and then activated through seccomp(2).
For the FMODE_EXECUTE/FMODE_WRITE, are you suggesting to manage
permission of the eBPF program FD in a specific way?
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