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Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2016 12:32:40 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>, David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [RFC v2 05/10] seccomp: Handle Landlock
A Landlock program can be triggered when a seccomp filter return
RET_LANDLOCK. Moreover, it is possible to return a 16-bit cookie which
will be readable by the Landlock programs.
Only seccomp filters loaded from the same thread and before a Landlock
program can trigger it. Multiple Landlock programs can be triggered by
one or more seccomp filters. This way, each RET_LANDLOCK (with specific
cookie) will trigger all the allowed Landlock programs once.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/seccomp.h | 49 +++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 2 +
kernel/fork.c | 39 ++++++++-
kernel/seccomp.c | 190 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 29b20fe8fd4d..785ccbebf687 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -10,7 +10,33 @@
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/seccomp.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+#include <linux/bpf.h> /* struct bpf_prog */
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
+
struct seccomp_filter;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+struct seccomp_landlock_ret {
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *prev;
+ /* @filter points to a @landlock_filter list */
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+ u16 cookie;
+ bool triggered;
+};
+
+struct seccomp_landlock_prog {
+ atomic_t usage;
+ struct seccomp_landlock_prog *prev;
+ /*
+ * List of filters (through filter->landlock_prev) allowed to trigger
+ * this Landlock program.
+ */
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
+
/**
* struct seccomp - the state of a seccomp'ed process
*
@@ -18,6 +44,10 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
* system calls available to a process.
* @filter: must always point to a valid seccomp-filter or NULL as it is
* accessed without locking during system call entry.
+ * @landlock_filter: list of filters allowed to trigger an associated
+ * Landlock hook via a RET_LANDLOCK.
+ * @landlock_ret: stored values from a RET_LANDLOCK.
+ * @landlock_prog: list of Landlock programs.
*
* @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
* is no read locking.
@@ -25,6 +55,12 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
struct seccomp {
int mode;
struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ struct seccomp_filter *landlock_filter;
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *landlock_ret;
+ struct seccomp_landlock_prog *landlock_prog;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
};
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
@@ -85,6 +121,12 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
extern void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+extern void put_landlock_ret(struct seccomp_landlock_ret *landlock_ret);
+extern struct seccomp_landlock_ret *dup_landlock_ret(
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *ret_orig);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
+
#else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
static inline void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
@@ -95,6 +137,13 @@ static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
return;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+static inline void put_landlock_ret(struct seccomp_landlock_ret *landlock_ret) {}
+static inline struct seccomp_landlock_ret *dup_landlock_ret(
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *ret_orig) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index 0f238a43ff1e..b4aab1c19b8a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
+#define SECCOMP_SET_LANDLOCK_HOOK 2
/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@
#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL 0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_LANDLOCK 0x00070000U /* trigger LSM evaluation */
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index b23a71ec8003..3658c1e95e03 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -369,7 +369,12 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
* the usage counts on the error path calling free_task.
*/
tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL;
-#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ tsk->seccomp.landlock_filter = NULL;
+ tsk->seccomp.landlock_ret = NULL;
+ tsk->seccomp.landlock_prog = NULL;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig);
clear_user_return_notifier(tsk);
@@ -1200,9 +1205,12 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
}
-static void copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p)
+static int copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *ret_walk;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
/*
* Must be called with sighand->lock held, which is common to
* all threads in the group. Holding cred_guard_mutex is not
@@ -1213,7 +1221,27 @@ static void copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p)
/* Ref-count the new filter user, and assign it. */
get_seccomp_filter(current);
- p->seccomp = current->seccomp;
+ p->seccomp.mode = current->seccomp.mode;
+ p->seccomp.filter = current->seccomp.filter;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ /* No copy for: landlock_filter, landlock_handle */
+ p->seccomp.landlock_prog = current->seccomp.landlock_prog;
+ if (p->seccomp.landlock_prog)
+ atomic_inc(&p->seccomp.landlock_prog->usage);
+ /* Deep copy for landlock_ret to avoid allocating for each syscall */
+ for (ret_walk = current->seccomp.landlock_ret;
+ ret_walk; ret_walk = ret_walk->prev) {
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *ret_new;
+
+ ret_new = dup_landlock_ret(ret_walk);
+ if (IS_ERR(ret_new)) {
+ put_landlock_ret(p->seccomp.landlock_ret);
+ return PTR_ERR(ret_new);
+ }
+ ret_new->prev = p->seccomp.landlock_ret;
+ p->seccomp.landlock_ret = ret_new;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
/*
* Explicitly enable no_new_privs here in case it got set
@@ -1231,6 +1259,7 @@ static void copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p)
if (p->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SECCOMP);
#endif
+ return 0;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(set_tid_address, int __user *, tidptr)
@@ -1589,7 +1618,9 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
* Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed
* before holding sighand lock.
*/
- copy_seccomp(p);
+ retval = copy_seccomp(p);
+ if (retval)
+ goto bad_fork_cancel_cgroup;
/*
* Process group and session signals need to be delivered to just the
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index f1f475691c27..5df7274c7ec3 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
* Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
+ *
* This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
*
* Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
@@ -33,6 +35,10 @@
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+#include <linux/bpf.h> /* bpf_prog_put() */
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
+
/**
* struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
*
@@ -58,6 +64,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
atomic_t usage;
struct seccomp_filter *prev;
struct bpf_prog *prog;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ struct seccomp_filter *landlock_prev;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
};
static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter);
@@ -179,6 +188,10 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
struct seccomp_data sd_local;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *landlock_ret, *init_landlock_ret =
+ current->seccomp.landlock_ret;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
/* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
struct seccomp_filter *f =
lockless_dereference(current->seccomp.filter);
@@ -191,6 +204,14 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd)
populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
sd = &sd_local;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ for (landlock_ret = init_landlock_ret;
+ landlock_ret;
+ landlock_ret = landlock_ret->prev) {
+ /* No need to clean the cookie. */
+ landlock_ret->triggered = false;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
/*
* All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
@@ -198,8 +219,27 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd)
*/
for (; f; f = f->prev) {
u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, (void *)sd);
+ u32 action = cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ u32 data = cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
+ if (action == SECCOMP_RET_LANDLOCK) {
+ /*
+ * Keep track of filters from the current task that
+ * trigger a RET_LANDLOCK.
+ */
+ for (landlock_ret = init_landlock_ret;
+ landlock_ret;
+ landlock_ret = landlock_ret->prev) {
+ if (landlock_ret->filter == f) {
+ landlock_ret->triggered = true;
+ landlock_ret->cookie = data;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
- if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
+ if (action < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
ret = cur_ret;
}
return ret;
@@ -426,6 +466,9 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
{
unsigned long total_insns;
struct seccomp_filter *walker;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *landlock_ret;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock);
@@ -450,6 +493,21 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
* task reference.
*/
filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ filter->landlock_prev = current->seccomp.landlock_filter;
+ current->seccomp.landlock_filter = filter;
+
+ /* Dedicated Landlock result */
+ landlock_ret = kmalloc(sizeof(*landlock_ret), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!landlock_ret)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ landlock_ret->prev = current->seccomp.landlock_ret;
+ atomic_inc(&filter->usage);
+ landlock_ret->filter = filter;
+ landlock_ret->cookie = 0;
+ landlock_ret->triggered = false;
+ current->seccomp.landlock_ret = landlock_ret;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
current->seccomp.filter = filter;
/* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
@@ -459,6 +517,55 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+struct seccomp_landlock_ret *dup_landlock_ret(
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *ret_orig)
+{
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *ret_new;
+
+ if (!ret_orig)
+ return NULL;
+ ret_new = kmalloc(sizeof(*ret_new), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ret_new)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ ret_new->filter = ret_orig->filter;
+ if (ret_new->filter)
+ atomic_inc(&ret_new->filter->usage);
+ ret_new->cookie = 0;
+ ret_new->triggered = false;
+ ret_new->prev = NULL;
+ return ret_new;
+}
+
+static void put_landlock_prog(struct seccomp_landlock_prog *landlock_prog)
+{
+ struct seccomp_landlock_prog *orig = landlock_prog;
+
+ /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
+ while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
+ struct seccomp_landlock_prog *freeme = orig;
+
+ put_seccomp_filter(orig->filter);
+ bpf_prog_put(orig->prog);
+ orig = orig->prev;
+ kfree(freeme);
+ }
+}
+
+void put_landlock_ret(struct seccomp_landlock_ret *landlock_ret)
+{
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *orig = landlock_ret;
+
+ while (orig) {
+ struct seccomp_landlock_ret *freeme = orig;
+
+ put_seccomp_filter(orig->filter);
+ orig = orig->prev;
+ kfree(freeme);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
+
/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
@@ -485,7 +592,9 @@ static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
+
orig = orig->prev;
+ /* must not put orig->landlock_prev */
seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
}
}
@@ -493,6 +602,10 @@ static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
put_seccomp_filter(tsk->seccomp.filter);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ put_landlock_prog(tsk->seccomp.landlock_prog);
+ put_landlock_ret(tsk->seccomp.landlock_ret);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
}
/**
@@ -609,6 +722,8 @@ static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd)
case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
return filter_ret; /* Save the rest for phase 2. */
+ case SECCOMP_RET_LANDLOCK:
+ /* fall through */
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
@@ -814,6 +929,75 @@ static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
}
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+
+/* Limit Landlock programs to 256KB. */
+#define LANDLOCK_PROG_LIST_MAX_PAGES (1 << 6)
+
+static long landlock_set_hook(unsigned int flags, const char __user *user_bpf_fd)
+{
+ long result;
+ unsigned long prog_list_pages;
+ struct seccomp_landlock_prog *landlock_prog, *cp_walker;
+ int bpf_fd;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+
+ if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
+ security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(),
+ current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+ if (!user_bpf_fd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* could be used for TSYNC */
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&bpf_fd, user_bpf_fd, sizeof(user_bpf_fd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ prog = bpf_prog_get(bpf_fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(prog))
+ return PTR_ERR(prog);
+ switch (prog->type) {
+ /* TODO: add LSM hooks */
+ default:
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ goto put_prog;
+ }
+
+ /* validate allocated memory */
+ prog_list_pages = prog->pages;
+ for (cp_walker = current->seccomp.landlock_prog; cp_walker;
+ cp_walker = cp_walker->prev) {
+ /* TODO: add penalty for each prog? */
+ prog_list_pages += cp_walker->prog->pages;
+ }
+ if (prog_list_pages > LANDLOCK_PROG_LIST_MAX_PAGES) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ goto put_prog;
+ }
+
+ landlock_prog = kmalloc(sizeof(*landlock_prog), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!landlock_prog) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ goto put_prog;
+ }
+ landlock_prog->prog = prog;
+ landlock_prog->filter = current->seccomp.filter;
+ if (landlock_prog->filter)
+ atomic_inc(&landlock_prog->filter->usage);
+ atomic_set(&landlock_prog->usage, 1);
+ landlock_prog->prev = current->seccomp.landlock_prog;
+ current->seccomp.landlock_prog = landlock_prog;
+ return 0;
+
+put_prog:
+ bpf_prog_put(prog);
+ return result;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
+
/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
const char __user *uargs)
@@ -825,6 +1009,10 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
+ case SECCOMP_SET_LANDLOCK_HOOK:
+ return landlock_set_hook(flags, uargs);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
--
2.8.1
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