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Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2016 18:09:44 +0100
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further
restriction of perf_event_open
On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 12:32:32PM -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
> On Thu, 2016-08-04 at 17:10 +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> I wasn't talking specifically about perf.
Then this is irrelevant to a discussion about limiting access to the
perf interface.
Hardening drivers in general is a very interesting topic, but it is a
different topic.
> > But please, let's frame the argument to match reality.
>
> The argument is framed in reality. Stating that it now often takes a
> few hours to find a vulnerability with the unaltered, widely known
> public perf fuzzer is not impressive. It's really an argument for
> claiming that it's a significant security issue.
My claim was not that the mainline code was impressively perfect, but
rather that the vendor code was worse, countering a prior claim
otherwise. Hence, reality.
There is cetainly much that can be done to improve things, if we discuss
that which is actually applicable.
Thanks,
Mark.
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