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Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 12:58:00 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>, Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>, Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@...ux.intel.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@...il.com>, Alexander Popov <alpopov@...ecurity.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@...el.com>,
Mark Salter <msalter@...hat.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@...e.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 12:33 PM, Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net> wrote:
> Hey Kees, Thomas,
>
> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 10:05:51AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 8:59 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 5:47 AM, Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net> wrote:
>> >> Hey Kees,
>> >>
>> >> On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 05:46:57PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >>> Notable problems that needed solving:
>> >> ...
>> >>> - Reasonable entropy is needed early at boot before get_random_bytes()
>> >>> is available.
>> >>
>> >> This series is targetting x86, which typically has RDRAND/RDSEED
>> >> instructions. Are you referring to other arches? Older x86? Also,
>> >> isn't this the same requirement for base address KASLR?
>> >>
>> >> Don't get me wrong, I want more diverse entropy sources available
>> >> earlier in the boot process as well. :-) I'm just wondering what's
>> >> different about this series vs base address KASLR wrt early entropy
>> >> sources.
>> >>
>> >
>> > I think Kees was referring to the refactor I did to get the similar
>> > entropy generation than KASLR module randomization. Our approach was
>> > to provide best entropy possible even if you have an older processor
>> > or under virtualization without support for these instructions.
>> > Unfortunately common on companies with a large number of older
>> > machines.
>>
>> Right, the memory offset KASLR uses the same routines as the kernel
>> base KASLR. The issue is with older x86 systems, which continue to be
>> very common.
>
> We have the same issue in embedded. :-( Compounded by the fact that
> there is no rand instruction (at least not on ARM). So, even if there's
> a HW-RNG, you can't access it until the driver is loaded.
>
> This is compounded by the fact that most systems deployed today have
> bootloaders a) without hw-rng drivers, b) without dtb editing, and c)
> without dtb support at all.
>
> My current thinking is to add a devicetree property
> "userspace,random-seed" <address, len>. This way, existing, deployed
> boards can append a dtb to a modern kernel with the property set.
> The factory bootloader then only needs to amend its boot scripts to read
> random-seed from the fs to the given address.
The arm64 KASLR implementation has defined a way for boot loaders to
pass in an seed similar to this. It might be nice to have a fall-back
to a DT entry, though, then the bootloaders don't need to changed.
Ard might have some thoughts on why DT wasn't used for KASLR (I assume
the early parsing overhead, but I don't remember the discussion any
more).
> Modern systems that receive a seed from the bootloader via the
> random-seed property (typically from the hw-rng) can mix both sources
> for increased resilience.
Yeah, that could work.
> Unfortunately, I'm not very familiar with the internals of x86
> bootstrapping. Could GRUB be scripted to do a similar task? How would
> the address and size of the seed be passed to the kernel? command line?
Command line could work (though it would need scrubbing to avoid it
leaking into /proc/cmdine), but there's also the "zero-page" used by
bootloaders to pass details to the kernel (see
Documentation/x86/boot.txt). Right now, x86 has sufficient entropy
(though rdrand is best).
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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