[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 13:06:35 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Speed up SLUB poisoning + disable checks
On Wed, Feb 3, 2016 at 10:46 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 01/25/2016 11:03 PM, Joonsoo Kim wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 05:15:10PM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Based on the discussion from the series to add slab sanitization
>>> (lkml.kernel.org/g/<1450755641-7856-1-git-send-email-laura@...bott.name>)
>>> the existing SLAB_POISON mechanism already covers similar behavior.
>>> The performance of SLAB_POISON isn't very good. With hackbench -g 20 -l
>>> 1000
>>> on QEMU with one cpu:
>>
>>
>> I doesn't follow up that discussion, but, I think that reusing
>> SLAB_POISON for slab sanitization needs more changes. I assume that
>> completeness and performance is matter for slab sanitization.
>>
>> 1) SLAB_POISON isn't applied to specific kmem_cache which has
>> constructor or SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU flag. For debug, it's not necessary
>> to be applied, but, for slab sanitization, it is better to apply it to
>> all caches.
>
>
> The grsecurity patches get around this by calling the constructor again
> after poisoning. It could be worth investigating doing that as well
> although my focus was on the cases without the constructor.
>>
>>
>> 2) SLAB_POISON makes object size bigger so natural alignment will be
>> broken. For example, kmalloc(256) cache's size is 256 in normal
>> case but it would be 264 when SLAB_POISON is enabled. This causes
>> memory waste.
>
>
> The grsecurity patches also bump the size up to put the free pointer
> outside the object. For sanitization purposes it is cleaner to have
> no pointers in the object after free
>
>>
>> In fact, I'd prefer not reusing SLAB_POISON. It would make thing
>> simpler. But, it's up to Christoph.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>
> It basically looks like trying to poison on the fast path at all
> will have a negative impact even with the feature is turned off.
> Christoph has indicated this is not acceptable so we are forced
> to limit it to the slow path only if we want runtime enablement.
Is it possible to have both? i.e fast path via CONFIG, and slow path
via runtime options?
> If we're limited to the slow path only, we might as well work
> with SLAB_POISON to make it faster. We can reevaluate if it turns
> out the poisoning isn't fast enough to be useful.
And since I'm new to this area, I know of fast/slow path in the
syscall sense. What happens in the allocation/free fast/slow path that
makes it fast or slow?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
