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Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 04:27:19 -0600
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
"kernel-hardening\@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Andy Lutomirski
<luto@...capital.net>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Al
Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Robert Święcki <robert@...ecki.net>, Dmitry Vyukov
<dvyukov@...gle.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Kostya
Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Sasha Levin
<sasha.levin@...cle.com>, "linux-doc\@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH 0/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 9:15 AM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com> wrote:
>> Quoting Josh Boyer (jwboyer@...oraproject.org):
>>> What you're saying is true for the "oh crap" case of a new userns
>>> related CVE being found. However, there is the case where sysadmins
>>> know for a fact that a set of machines should not allow user
>>> namespaces to be enabled. Currently they have 2 choices, 1) use their
>>
>> Hi - can you give a specific example of this? (Where users really should
>> not be able to use them - not where they might not need them) I think
>> it'll help the discussion tremendously. Because so far the only good
>> arguments I've seen have been about actual bugs in the user namespaces,
>> which would not warrant a designed-in permanent disable switch. If
>> there are good use cases where such a disable switch will always be
>> needed (and compiling out can't satisfy) that'd be helpful.
>
> My example is a machine in a colo rack serving web pages. A site gets
> attacked, and www-data uses user namespaces to continue their attack
> to gain root privileges.
>
> The admin of such a machine could have disabled userns months earlier
> and limited the scope of the attack.
Of course for the paranoid there is already a mechanism to do this.
/sbin/chroot.
No new user namespaces are allowed to be created inside of a chroot.
Eric
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