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Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 20:34:01 -0700
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, eldad@...refinery.com, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com, Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, George Spelvin <linux@...izon.com>, "kernel-hardening\@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, "linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK
Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com> writes:
> On 11/10/13 13:20, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com> writes:
>>
>>> Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read
>>> permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which
>>> use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time,
>>> but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid
>>> binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates
>>> permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be
>>> leaked.
>>>
>>> This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu
>>> 12.04:
>>>
>>> $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms
>>> 00000000 T startup_32
>>>
>>> $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms
>>> pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000'
>>>
>>> This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other
>>> setuid binaries may leak more information.
>>>
>>> Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process
>>> having CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the
>>> real ids. If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses
>>> %pK then the pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user
>>> is unprivileged.
>>>
>>> Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also
>>> correct the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default.
>>
>> Sigh. This is all wrong. The only correct thing to test is
>> file->f_cred. Aka the capabilities of the program that opened the
>> file.
>>
>> Which means that the interface to %pK in the case of kptr_restrict is
>> broken as it has no way to be passed the information it needs to make
>> a sensible decision.
>
> Would it make sense to add a struct file * to struct seq_file and set
> that in seq_open? Then the capability check can be done against
> seq->file.
It would make most sense to do the capability check at open time,
and cache the result. Doing it generically so that seq_printf could
still use %pK doesn't sound wrong, but it does sound convoluted.
Eric
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