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Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 18:39:00 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
tixxdz@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener
of /proc/*/stat
On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
> Some fields of the /proc/*/stat are sensitive fields that need
> appropriate protection.
>
> However, /proc file descriptors can be passed to a more privileged
> process (e.g. a suid-exec) which will pass the classic
> ptrace_may_access() permission check during read().
>
> To prevent it, use proc_same_open_cred() to detect if current's cred
> have changed between ->open() and ->read(), if so, call
> proc_allow_access() to check if the original file's opener had enough
> permissions to read these sensitive fields. This will prevent passing
> file descriptors to a more privileged process to leak data.
>
> The patch also adds a previously missing signal->cred_guard_mutex lock.
>
> This patch does not break userspace since it only hides the fields that
> were supposed to be protected.
>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
> ---
> fs/proc/array.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
> index cbd0f1b..f034e05 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/array.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/array.c
> @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> char state;
> pid_t ppid = 0, pgid = -1, sid = -1;
> int num_threads = 0;
> - int permitted;
> + int permitted = 0;
> struct mm_struct *mm;
> unsigned long long start_time;
> unsigned long cmin_flt = 0, cmaj_flt = 0;
> @@ -404,10 +404,22 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> unsigned long rsslim = 0;
> char tcomm[sizeof(task->comm)];
> unsigned long flags;
> + struct file *file = m->private;
> + int same_cred = proc_same_open_cred(file->f_cred);
> + unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT;
>
> state = *get_task_state(task);
> vsize = eip = esp = 0;
> - permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
> +
> + if (!mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) {
> + permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode);
> + if (permitted && !same_cred)
> + permitted = proc_allow_access(file->f_cred,
> + task, ptrace_mode);
> +
> + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> + }
> +
else permitted = false?
But surely this would be *much* more comprehensible if you had
proc_allow_access do the entire check.
--Andy
--Andy
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