kernel-hardening mailing list - 2013/09

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2013/09

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
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²	³	⁴	⁵	⁶	⁷	⁸
⁹	¹⁰	¹¹	¹² 1	¹³	¹⁴	¹⁵
¹⁶	¹⁷	¹⁸	¹⁹	²⁰	²¹	²²
²³	²⁴	²⁵ 13	²⁶ 4	²⁷ 2	²⁸ 2	²⁹ 1
³⁰

Messages by day:

September 1 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

September 12 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)

September 25 (13 messages)

[PATCH 0/12] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 01/12] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 02/12] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 03/12] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 05/12] seq_file: set the seq_file->f_cred during seq_open() (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 06/12] procfs: make /proc/*/stack 0400 (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 07/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stack (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 08/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 09/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 10/12] procfs: move PROC_BLOCK_SIZE declaration up to make it visible (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 11/12] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 12/12] user_ns: seq_file: use the user_ns that is embedded in the f_cred struct (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)

September 26 (4 messages)

Re: [PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
Re: [PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
Re: [PATCH 06/12] procfs: make /proc/*/stack 0400 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

September 27 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)

September 28 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH 06/12] procfs: make /proc/*/stack 0400 (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)

September 29 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH 06/12] procfs: make /proc/*/stack 0400 (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)

25 messages

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