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Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 15:08:32 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...el.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>,
        Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>,
        Eric Northup <digitaleric@...gle.com>,
        Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR

On 04/05/2013 03:06 PM, Julien Tinnes wrote:
> 
> Speaking of IDT, and to capture some off-thread discussion here, we
> should remember that the "SGDT" and "SIDT" instructions aren't
> privileged on x86, so user-land can leak these out without any way for
> the kernel to intercept that.
> 
> Adding their own random offsets to these two tables would be very
> useful. This could be done in a later patchset of course.
> 

Yes, if the GDT or IDT position is at all correlated to the kernel
position this is pointless.

	-hpa


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