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Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 12:55:17 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, arnd@...db.de, davem@...emloft.net, hpa@...or.com,
mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org,
rdunlap@...otime.net, mcgrathr@...omium.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
luto@....edu, eparis@...hat.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
djm@...drot.org, scarybeasts@...il.com, indan@....nu, pmoore@...hat.com,
corbet@....net, eric.dumazet@...il.com, markus@...omium.org,
coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org, jmorris@...ei.org, Andy
Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, linux-man@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent
execve from granting privs
On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>
> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
> subverting privileged binaries.
The changelog doesn't explain the semantics of the new syscall.
There's a comment way-down-there which I guess suffices, if you hunt
for it.
And the changelog doesn't explain why this is being added. Presumably
seccomp_filter wants/needs this feature but whowhatwherewhenwhy? Spell
it all out, please.
The new syscall mode will be documented in the prctl manpage. Please
cc linux-man@...r.kernel.org and work with Michael on getting this
done?
>
> ...
>
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