[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2012 11:10:04 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Marcin Slusarz <marcin.slusarz@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 2:23 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
>
> * Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
>> Clean-up of hardlink restriction logic, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> ---
>> fs/namei.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>> 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
>> index 8ed4e00..a4a21a5 100644
>> --- a/fs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/namei.c
>> @@ -693,46 +693,69 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link)
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> + * safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions
>> + * @inode: the source inode to hardlink from
>> + *
>> + * Return false if at least one of the following conditions:
>> + * - inode is not a regular file
>> + * - inode is setuid
>> + * - inode is setgid and group-exec
>> + * - access failure for read and write
>> + *
>> + * Otherwise returns true.
>> + */
>> +static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
>> +{
>> + mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
>> +
>> + /* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
>> + if (!S_ISREG(mode))
>> + return false;
>> + /* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
>> + if (mode & S_ISUID)
>> + return false;
>> + /* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
>> + if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
>> + return false;
>> + /* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
>> + if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + return true;
>
> A really minor nitpick, could we use this form please:
>
> static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
> {
> mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
>
> /* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
> if (!S_ISREG(mode))
> return false;
>
> /* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
> if (mode & S_ISUID)
> return false;
>
> /* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */
> if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
> return false;
>
> /* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
> if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
> return false;
>
> return true;
> }
>
> Those separate blocks of comments and conditions stand out much
> nicer this way, making it way easier on the eyes - to my eyes at
> least ;-)
Heh, sure. I've sent v2 now. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
